Research Symposium

BIO

I'm from Saint Louis/San Diego. I came to Florida State because of it's excellent academic opportunities and it's affordable price. As an aspiring researcher, I love asking questions and discovering examples of correlation and causation. Outside of the classroom, I love to write, listen to music, make music and play videogames.

Honesty and Observability

Abstract

In this project, we use an experiment centered on the likelihood of lies when the probability of detection changes. The experiment consists of a game where subjects receive a private message and are then given the opportunity to dishonestly report that message. Higher reports equal higher pay, so lying is incentivized. Previous experiments have focused on two settings: 1. The experimenter can verify the private message of every subject in the experiment such that he knows whether each individual subject is truthfully reporting, and 2. The experimenter cannot verify the private message of any of the subjects in the experiment such that it is impossible for him to know whether any individual subject is truthfully reporting. We expand on these settings of 100% and 0% observability by conducting trials at 20% and 50% observability, in which a proportion of decisions are observed but the remainder are not. We then analyzed and tested models related to the utility a subject receives from reporting different messages. Through this, we gain insight into the tension between personal gains and the desire to be (or appear to be) honest.

Keywords: Economics, Experimental Economics, Lying