



Buying and Selling Foreign Aid: Donor Motivations and Public Perceptions of Foreign Aid

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Foreign aid network of nonpermanent members of the UNSC in 1960



Foreign aid network of nonpermanent members of the UNSC in 2020

- The countries in the middle are the nonpermanent members of the UNSC receiving aid
- The countries surrounding those are the donor nations which are providing aid
- For both images, the thickness of the lines represents the amount of aid, therefore thicker lines are representative of greater amounts of aid

Research Motivation

- Countries utilize foreign aid to achieve international and national policy goals and to protect national interests
- States also utilize foreign aid as a method of buying votes on the UN Security Council (UNSC)
- Previous research has only focused on how foreign aid from a SINGLE donor nation, which fails to account for other donor nations providing aid simultaneously

This research aims to analyze the effect of multiple donor nations on the behavior of the recipient nation. Houser argues that a state's behavior is influenced by:

1) How much aid a recipient state receives

AND

2) How many donor nations give the recipient state foreign aid

The research question this research will be focusing on is:

How does an aid-for-policy deal with one donor nation impact another donor nation's ability to make an aid-for-policy deal with the same recipient state?

Method

- For this research, my mentor Zachary Houser, constructed a dataset by combining foreign aid data from the OECD and Chinese foreign aid data from the AidData set developed at the College of William and Mary.
- To address missing data, we utilized the **R Package Amelia II** to create five multiple imputed data sets.
- In order to determine how being on the UNSC changes a country's position in the foreign aid network a **Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM)** was utilized as it allows us to see how past and current foreign aid being received impacts the amount of aid received when the state is on the UNSC
- The dependent variable is a **directed weighted network** in which the nodes are countries, and the edges are the amount of foreign aid being sent from donor countries to recipient countries in year t .
- The key independent variables for this method are a **state's degree centrality measure in year $t-1$** and **USNC membership**

Abstract

How does an aid-for-policy deal with one donor nation impact another donor nation's ability to make an aid-for-policy deal with the same recipient state? Previous research has analyzed the behavior and decision-making of recipient states when aid is being provided by a single donor nation. However, this approach fails to account for all the other countries that are simultaneously giving aid to the recipient country. This paper argues that the behavior of recipient nations is influenced by 1) **how much aid a recipient country receives from donor nations** and 2) **how many donor nations give the recipient country foreign aid**. Through the analysis of foreign aid as a network, this research tests if a nation's position in the foreign aid network affects the amount of foreign aid that is required to buy a state's vote on the UN Security Council while said state serves as a non-permanent member.

Conclusions

- This research is based on the paper written by Kuzmicko and Werker which concluded that nonpermanent members of the U.N. Security Council **did** receive additional foreign aid and that council membership itself is the driving factor for this increased aid.
- Our network analysis is extremely sensitive to missing data, and therefore we are still working to obtain said data
- The figures above demonstrate that today nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council receive aid from a larger number of countries than in the past, making it harder for a single donor nation to "buy" a state's vote as they are receiving aid from so many others.

Bibliography

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